Tax concessions by O'Hagan, J.
57 Tax concessions
John O’Hagan
Introduction1
Taxation measures aiding the donation of gifts or bequests to the arts are
applied on a major scale in the United States. Some of these measures have
formed the cornerstone of government policy towards the arts in the
United States since the beginning of the twentieth century and they are
defended vehemently to this day. In contrast, while such measures exist in
some countries in Europe they have rarely been used on any signiﬁcant
scale. Despite this, there are many who call for more of a United States-type
tax policy in Europe, and such calls appear to have increased in number and
volume in recent years. There have, however, been trenchant criticisms of
the US tax policy measures in relation to charitable contributions as they
apply to the arts, the most authoritative and comprehensive of these being
that by Feld et al. (1983). Despite the force of the arguments to the con-
trary, few involved in the arts or policy making in the United States appear
today to question this tax policy as a means of channelling public money
to the arts. Weil (1991) in particular, in an elegantly argued piece, defends
these tax policies over direct government grants and bemoans the diminu-
tion of the scale of the tax incentive resulting from tax changes in the
United States. Simon (1987) also defends tax concessions over government
grants in a very comprehensive review of the tax treatment of non-proﬁt
organizations in the United States.
It must be noted, however, that there are tax expenditures on the arts in
Europe which, although much smaller in magnitude than those for chari-
table contributions in the United States, and more elusive, are ﬁercely
defended by the arts communities there and apparently matter greatly. In
particular the concessions in relation to value-added tax (VAT) have been
subjected to considerable public debate. Besides this, the important prop-
erty tax exemption is prevalent in both Europe and the United States.
Key policy questions
What precisely are these tax measures? What is the cost of these measures
to the taxpayer? What are the eﬀects of these measures on art institutions?
What are their eﬀects on the level and composition of arts inputs and
output? These are the questions that matter in relation to tax expenditures
and some of them will be examined brieﬂy here.
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In deciding on which of the measures deserve most examination, we
could choose those measures that incur the greatest tax expenditure in prac-
tice or we could choose the tax measure that has the greatest impact on arts
institutions and artists. Alternatively, we could choose some other criter-
ion, such as the tax concession for which there is the most information in
terms of data, or that with the most interesting analytical features. The
latter considerations predominate in discussions of tax policy in general,
despite the fact that, from a policy point of view, the tax has no practical
signiﬁcance. The criterion that will most inﬂuence the discussion here is the
one which places emphasis on tax revenue forgone, although other consid-
erations will also be considered.
Main tax expenditures
In the United States the charitable contribution deduction is by far the
most important in terms of tax forgone, and it is followed by the property
tax exemption and the capital gains tax remission of gifts to arts institu-
tions in this regard: for example, Feld et al. (1983) estimate that the individ-
ual charitable deduction concession is, in terms of tax forgone, around
twice that of the property tax exemption, and almost three times that both
of the corporate charitable deduction and of the capital gains tax and
gift/estate tax concession combined.2 Most of the tax measures in the
United States have particular relevance for art museums and as a result they
appear to be the most favoured arts institutions in this regard.
In Europe the picture is very diﬀerent, although one must be careful not
to overgeneralize because of the large number of independent states
involved. A related problem in commenting on the European experience is
that it is very diﬃcult to obtain up-to-date descriptions of the tax situations
that actually apply in relation to the arts: much of the discussion therefore
in relation to Europe has, of necessity, to refer to work that is quite dated.
Tax expenditures associated with charitable contribution deductions
appear to be small, judging from the evidence that is available, one of the
reasons for this perhaps being that similarly favourable tax exemptions do
not appear to apply to gifts or bequests of property, the main reason being
that, independent of tax concessions, Europeans may see charitable contri-
butions as a function of their much higher general tax rates and not as
something that they are expected to pay in addition to their taxes.3 The
major eﬀective tax concession in fact is the preferential VAT treatment of
the consumption of the output of the arts sector, but no estimates appear
to have been made of the cost of this tax concession. This is a tax conces-
sion that would favour in particular the performing arts, as it usually
applies to the output of all performing arts organizations, not just the pub-
licly funded institutions, which also receive notable levels of direct public
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assistance. Property tax exemption for arts institutions is also widespread
in Europe, but again there has been remarkably little discussion, at least in
the English language literature, of this aspect of arts policy. In contrast, the
tax concessions that apply in some large European countries in relation to
relief from estate duty/capital transfer taxes have been analysed in detail
despite the fact that the tax expenditures associated with these concessions
are small: the reason appears to be more to do with the interesting analyt-
ical and practical issues that the policy entails, as well as the very high level
of public controversy that has accompanied the sale of artefacts which are
seen as part of the national patrimony, situations that these taxes are some-
times designed to address.4
Lack of recognition of cost to the state of tax breaks
It appears odd that so many people still do not associate a cost (that is, a
tax expenditure) with a tax break in relation to the arts and that so many
governments have still so few data relating to the precise cost of various tax
concessions to the arts. Why is this? The ﬁrst reason is that tax expenditure
analysis in general, especially its inclusion in the budget process, is of recent
origin and is still not formally included in budget accounts for many coun-
tries. Part of this has to do with the fact that many diﬀerent tax expendi-
tures are extremely diﬃcult to estimate, both for data reasons and because
the estimation depends on what behavioural assumptions about the key
players are made by the analyst.5 Second, in relation to the arts, some have
argued that the main tax break, the charitable contribution deduction, does
not involve a tax expenditure at all, on the grounds that income devoted to
a charitable cause (which is how a contribution to the arts is classiﬁed) is
not available to the person for his or her own consumption, but for the con-
sumption of all, and should not be taxed to him or her.6 There are very few,
though, in the economics or legal profession who appear to support this
argument. Third, tax expenditures are rarely designed for the arts speciﬁ-
cally, but are established in relation to some much wider target group,
such as charities in the United States, of which sector the arts is only a tiny
component. Even if estimates of the tax expenditure for the sector were
available, it is unlikely that they would be available for every small sub-
component. Fourth, it may be that the very obscurity of a tax expenditure
removes the pressure to quantify it. The state’s contribution to a local
wealthy individual’s gift to his or her local museum is never identiﬁed as
such by the individual or the museum. The donor is treated in every oﬃcial
version of this transaction, and by the media, as the sole source of the
funds. Likewise, what local government computes the value of a property
tax exemption to a local theatre? If its value is unknown it appears as a cost-
less subsidy, especially since no money actually changes hands. Yet this
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exemption is in many respects equivalent in ﬁnancial terms to the local
government providing a tied direct grant to the local theatre, the value of
which would of course be known and debated in public.7
It is this very obscurity that provided the driving force for the Feld et al.
treatise, as they see it as the principal defect of the tax break system to the
arts, preventing it from looming in the consciousness of arts administra-
tors, scholars and the public alike. Whatever the controversy may be over
the tax expenditure associated with taxation policy, it is clear that these tax
breaks are highly valued by the arts community (judging at least from the
reaction when there is a proposal to abolish them) as each and every one of
them bestows favours on the arts sector, even though it may be very diﬃ-
cult to quantify the exact magnitude of the implicit subsidy involved. A
related point is that, even if the implicit subsidy could be accurately calcu-
lated, proposals to replace it with a direct and explicit subsidy are mostly
rejected by the arts community on the understandable grounds that there is
no guarantee that, once the tax concession is abolished, governments will
not subsequently renege on their promise to replace it fully with a direct
subsidy.
An examination of speciﬁc tax breaks illustrates most clearly the nature
of the tax expenditure involved. Nowhere is this truer than in relation to
the deductions that can be claimed against income tax in the United States,
the most important and signiﬁcant tax that applies to the arts anywhere,
and the VAT concessions applying in Europe.
Individual charitable contribution deductions in the United States
The federal income tax code in the United States accounts for three signiﬁ-
cant income tax expenditures for the arts: individual charitable income tax
deductions, corporate income tax deductions and capital gains tax forgone
on gifts of property. The charitable contribution deduction, as seen earlier,
accounts for the vast bulk of the tax expenditure under this heading,
though, and is the cornerstone of indirect federal aid to the arts in the
United States (for a discussion of the other two, see O’Hagan, 1998).
Since 1917, individual taxpayers in the United States have been allowed
to deduct contributions to non-proﬁt, charitable institutions, including arts
institutions, when computing their income taxes, at both federal and state
level (see Fullerton, 1991). Although the basic principles of the charitable
contribution deduction are in operation in several European countries, the
charitable contribution system in practice is of little signiﬁcance, in terms
of take-up, to the arts in Europe, although this may be changing.
The tax deduction clearly changes the price to the donor of a charitable
gift to the arts. Speciﬁcally, the deduction reduces the net cost to him or her
of channelling a ﬁxed sum to an arts institution and thereby could induce
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donors to provide even more than they would in the absence of the tax con-
cession. Thus, for example, if a donor wanted to give $500 to a museum
before the tax concession and the marginal tax rate of this donor was 50
per cent, the eﬀect of the tax concession would, ﬁrst, be to reduce the after-
tax cost to the donor to $250 and, second, to induce some response to this
by the donor, in particular to increase the initial gift. If the donor increased
the gift to $1000, the net cost would be $500, the same as the individual was
prepared to donate before the tax concession. The magnitude of this
induced giving, that is the price elasticity with respect to charitable giving
to the arts, is central to the economics of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion.
One key feature of the charitable contribution deduction to note is that
the tax expenditure depends on the marginal tax rate of the donor, ranging
from zero, for those who are not liable for income tax, to the top rate times
the value of the gift, for those in the highest income bracket (for illustrative
purposes, assume that the top rate is 50 per cent: the top marginal rate at
the federal level has in fact varied very considerably in the United States
over the last 70 years). Thus, the higher a person’s marginal tax rate, the
more the gift will be subsidized by the state: a gift of $500 from those on
the zero rate will cost the state nothing, and the donor the full $500,
whereas a gift from a donor on a marginal rate of 50 per cent will cost the
donor only $250, the state paying the rest of the bill of $250. This feature
of the charitable contribution deduction has come in for the most criticism.
Value-added tax (VAT) concessions in Europe
The VAT concession on the consumption of the output of the arts applies
only in Europe and, as mentioned previously, may involve a large tax expen-
diture in relation to the arts, both in absolute terms and in relation to direct
funding to such institutions.
In principle, the VAT is a pure revenue-raising tax, the intention being
that a uniform rate would apply to all goods and services, thereby leaving
relative prices and, therefore, the choices of individuals in the market place
unchanged. This, and its administrative simplicity, at least in a computer-
ized economy, were seen as the major advantages of the tax. The practice
is rather diﬀerent. In particular, diﬀerent rates of VAT now apply to diﬀer-
ent goods, thereby providing a tax incentive to the sectors with the lower
rates.
Practice varies considerably between the countries of the European
Union, with regard both to the standard rate and to the rates that apply to
outputs of the arts sector. The level of the standard rate is important, as it
is in relation to this that the tax expenditure associated with the lower rates
would be calculated.8 It is clear that in Europe the intention is to have a
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lower rate of VAT for the arts sector, as the Sixth European Council
Directive of 1977 committed the member states eventually to exempt
theatre, concerts and other cultural events, the reason being the public
interest.
The tax forgone associated with the concession is likely to be very size-
able, as it would amount to 15 to 20 per cent of box oﬃce income of all per-
forming arts companies, not just the non-proﬁt institutions. This assumes,
though, that attendance would not drop signiﬁcantly if VAT were imposed
on the performing arts sector. As mentioned, reduced VAT rates apply to
all arts institutions, which makes this tax concession a very unfocused
funding device for the government.
Notes
1. For a fuller discussion on the topics discussed here, see O’Hagan (1998); see also Schuster
(1999).
2. In total this came to around 2.5 times the total direct aid to the arts (Feld et al., 1983).
3. A further reason may be related to the more unequal distribution of income in the United
States, and the higher per capita incomes there, which, together, would mean many more
very wealthy people than in Europe.
4. See O’Hagan and McAndrew (2001) for a discussion of these.
5. For example, if the tax concession of a zero VAT rate on theatre admissions was abol-
ished, what assumption would be made about the level of attendance resulting from the
higher price? If, say, it dropped by 50 per cent, is the tax forgone calculated on the basis
of attendance after or before the tax is imposed?
6. Simon (1987) provides a very useful discussion of this issue. The essence of the argument
is that ‘an item of revenue received by a taxpayer and then given away to charity during
the same period does not increase the taxpayer’s net worth’ (p.73). It applies also, Simon
argues, to the estate tax charitable deduction, in that the deﬁnition of wealth for estate
tax purposes should refer to those assets available only for private accumulation or con-
sumption of private goods (and not public or semi-public goods such as the output of an
art museum). While Simon argues that these points should not be rejected, he does appear
to recognize that the general view, both in legal and in economic circles, is that such deduc-
tions do constitute a tax expenditure or indirect subsidy.
7. Simon argues that the property tax exemption may not be an exemption at all, in that
property tax should not apply anyway to many arts institutions since they do not form
part of a correctly deﬁned property tax base (Simon, 1987). However, this is a view that
is diﬃcult to sustain.
8. Or more correctly, perhaps, the rate that would apply if there were a single rate applied to
all goods and services.
See also:
Chapter 16: Corporate arts sponsorship; Chapter 43: Non-proﬁt organizations; Chapter 50:
Public support.
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